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Abstract:  Consumerism arises when patients acquire and use medical information from sources 
apart from their physicians, such as the Internet and direct-to-patient advertising.  Consumerism 
has been hailed as a means of improving quality.   This need not be the result.  Consumerist 
patients place additional demands on their doctors’ time, thus imposing a negative externality on 
other patients.  Our theoretical model has the physician treat both consumerist and ordinary 
patient under a binding time budget.  Relative to a world in which consumerism does not exist, 
consumerism is never Pareto improving, and in some cases harms both consumerist and ordinary 
patients.  Data from a large national survey of physicians shows that high levels of consumerism 
are associated with lower perceived quality.  Three different measures of quality were employed.  
The analysis uses instrumental  variables to  control  for the  endogeneity  of consumerism.  A 
control function approach is employed, since our dependent variable is ordered and categorical, 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The attention of the US health policy community has increasingly focused on quality 
problems in  recent  years.  The  shortfalls  are  well  documented.  In  one  of  the  most  often-
mentioned studies,  McGlynn  et al. (2003)  examined  439 markers  for quality of  care  for 30 
different  conditions  and  found  that,  on  average,  patients  receive  only  54.9  percent  of 
recommended  care.  These  omissions  have  significant  costs.  According  to  the  National 
Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA, 2005, p. 10), gaps in health care quality lead to $2.8 -
$4.2 billion in additional medical costs, costs that would not have been incurred if high-quality 
care had been delivered initially. The costs of low quality are felt well beyond the healthcare 
sector. They account for between 39,000 and 83,000 preventable deaths each year, 83.1 million 
additional sick days and $13 billion in lost productivity (NCQA, 2005, p. 10).
Over the past several decades, the US health care system has transformed from a model 
dominated  by  private  insurance  companies  that  contracted  with  individual  physicians  and/or 
providers to one in which managed care organizations played a very active role, and finally to 
one in which decision making power once again devolved to individual patients and physicians. 
However,  rather  than  solving  the  problem  of  quality,  this  evolution  has  led  to  continuing 
widespread problems of quality, what the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2000) has termed the 
“Quality Chasm”
For most economic goods, market competition among private suppliers is the principal 
tool  for  promoting  quality  and  controlling  costs.  Traditional  fee-for-service  reimbursement 
fosters competition. Since patients are free to choose any provider, they will flock to those who 
provide high quality care. And, given that quality attracts patients, providers have an incentive to 
improve quality. However, the parts of health care quality that are easy to observe (e.g., courtesy 3
in the doctor’s office) are often not relevant for health outcomes, while the salient indicators of 
quality for health outcomes (e.g., risk-adjusted morbidity and mortality) are notoriously difficult 
to  observe.  As  a  result,  we  would  not expect  market  forces  to  do  a  good job  of  focusing 
providers’ attention on the most critical aspects of quality. Further, since patients cover only a 
small portion of their costs at the point of consumption, we might expect inadequate cost control 
to  accompany  gold  plating  of  observable  quality  indicators  and  the  misalignment  of  quality 
incentives,  (Relman,  1993).  Indeed,  costs  did  skyrocket  during  the  era  when  fee-for-service 
dominated and competition among doctors flourished.       
Managed care rose to prominence in the early 1980s, largely as a response to the excesses 
of the fee-for-service system. Cost-control was probably its major objective, but there were also 
strong hopes that it would promote quality. Several features of managed care offered promise in 
these two domains. Many managed care plans offer “one-stop shopping”; that is, patients may 
receive all of their care within the managed-care network. In theory, this should promote better 
quality of care by improving treatment continuity and information exchange among providers. 
Moreover,  managed  care  organizations  have  strong  incentives  to  provide  preventive  care 
(Dysinger,  1996),  which  may  both  promote  quality  of  care  and  yield  future  cost  savings. 
Empirical  evidence  indicates  that  managed  care  in  fact  is  associated  with  greater  use  of 
preventive services (Balkrishnan et al., 2002; Rizzo, 2005). Having all care delivered under one 
roof may promote greater efficiencies in production and/or economies of scale in service, leading 
to  cost  savings  (Sullivan,  2000;  Brown  and  Pagan,  2006).  Moreover,  given  capitation,  the
underlying financial incentives could help to hold down costs. 
While costs were constrained as manage care blossomed, especially during the mid-1990s, 
health care costs resumed their upward trend in the late 1990s. Moreover, both patients and 4
providers became increasingly disenchanted with restrictions on treatment choices imposed by 
managed care, believing that they had impaired quality, a phenomenon that became known as 
“Managed Care Backlash” (Blendon et al., 1998; Enthoven and Singer, 1998; Miller and Luft, 
1997,  2002,  Miller  2006). Patients  thought  their inability to  choose  among  physicians  more 
broadly hurt quality, and insisted on changes. In response to these patient pressures, restrictions 
on physician choice in the HMO model declined significantly in the late 1990s; many HMOs 
now offer broad access (Robinson, 2001; Draper et al., 2002).  At the plan level, increases in 
health insurance premiums and copayments (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007) have no doubt 
prompted consumers to increase scrutiny of their plan and treatment options.
Perhaps as a reaction to their dissatisfaction with managed care, consumers in recent 
years  have  come  to  play  a  much  more  active  role  in  their  personal  medical  care  decisions 
(Robinson, 2005), a phenomenon that has become known as “consumerism”  (Teutsch, 2003; 
Rosenthal and Milstein, 2004; Dutta-Bergman, 2003; Havlin et al., 2003).
1    At the same time, 
there has been a rapid increase in the availability of medical information to consumers, from 
health-care  report  card  programs,  direct-to-consumer  advertising,  and  particularly  over  the 
internet.
As  in  the  case  of  private  competition  and  managed  care,  many  have  argued  that 
consumerism will provide a lever to improve quality. As patients learn more about their medical 
needs and the quality of different providers, they will flock to the best ones, which will, in turn, 
give providers an incentive to increase quality. Further, since the success of modern medical 
treatment  often  requires  high  levels  of  compliance  by  patients,  consumerism  promises  the 
additional benefit that, more-informed patients will be better patients. Moreover, to the extent 
that physicians value patient input and involvement in decisionmaking, more inquisitive and 5
questioning patients may be seen as desirable and complementary to the physician's efforts to 
provide high-quality care. For example, consumers – who have greater interest in their health 
than  do  their  physicians  – might  do  considerable  research  on  their  conditions,  which  could 
complement or stimulate the relevant knowledge of the doctor. More knowledge by consumers 
could make them better able or more willing to follow the doctor’s instructions, for example in 
taking prescribed medications. 
While the potential of consumerism to improve quality is clear, there is a darker side to 
the  phenomenon,  and  a-priori, the  relationship  between consumerism  and  quality  of  care  is 
indeterminate. On the negative side, consumerist  patients might follow their own beliefs, as 
opposed to those of their more knowledgeable physicians, in effect undermining the physician’s 
clinical autonomy, taking more physician time, and perverting the agency relationship. A recent 
article on physician interactions with consumerist patients is quite telling:
A few months ago, Dr. David Golden says, he had to fire a patient for being 
obnoxious. The patient had a cough. After examining him, Golden recommended 
a medication. But the patient did his own research and became worried about 
side effects. “He said, ‘But I read about this on the Internet, and I know this and I 
know that, and I know I’m right.’ “remembered Golden, an allergist in Maryland. 
Golden says he tried to explain why the side effects weren’t as bad as the patient 
thought, and why the medicine would take care of his cough. “But he wasn’t open 
to discussing anything. He countermanded everything I said. So I told him, `You 
know it all, so go take care of yourself. I’m not your doctor any more.’ “Golden 
says  he’s  all  for  empowered  and  educated  patients,  but  some  patients  have 6
become so empowered, they’re actually putting their care in jeopardy. “I’ve been 
doing this for 28 years, and unquestionably it’s gotten much worse,” Golden says. 
(Cohen, 2008)
While such negative interactions are far from an inevitable consequence of consumerist 
patients, there is no debate that more consumer involvement in decisionmaking has altered the 
doctor-patient relationship. Virtually all observers agree. A recent editorial (2005) in the Lancet,
focused on consumerism and the doctor-patient relationship, but left open the question of effects 
on quality:
Patients  have a wealth of  information  at their fingertips through  the internet. 
What most do not have, however, is the skill and knowledge to sift useful and 
valid information and evidence from useless or  harmful advice. In a mutually 
beneficial  and  effective  patient-doctor  partnership,  medical  expertise  and 
knowledge need to be an accepted and valued part of that interaction, just as 
much  as  doctors  need  to  have  the  time  and  skills  to  communicate  preventive 
measures and treatment choices to patients appropriately (p. 343)
Consumerist proclivities also have the potential to strongly affect the physician’s time 
allocation, possibly in a negative fashion. Time is the prime scarce resource in the doctor-patient 
relationship, and is a fundamental input into quality of care. It is the focus of our theoretical 
model,  and a central element  of our empirical study.  In this  respect, consumerism  could be 7
beneficial if it enabled patients to effectively demand more time from their doctor – who often 
has an incentive to move on – when their condition merits more care and attention. 
On the down side, consumerist patients may in effect be “time hogs,” the “demanding 
customers”  of  our  title,  who  describe  their  symptoms  and  knowledge  at  length,  perhaps 
recognizing that more minutes with the doctor may benefit them, if only marginally, even as it 
takes critical time from others. In the worst case, physicians may have to spend extra time and 
effort dissuading consumerist patients from requested treatments of dubious value. Recognizing 
that consumerism could affect the productivity of physician time positively or negatively, the 
effect of consumerism on the quality of care becomes an empirical issue, which we seek to 
resolve in this study. 
  We wish to understand the effects of consumerism on the time physicians have to work 
with  their  patients,  and  the  resulting  effects  on  quality  of  care.  To  date,  there  is  no  direct 
evidence on the effects of consumerism on either time adequacy for office visits or the quality of 
care. An ideal research design would relate the prevalence of consumerist practices, say the 
proportion of consumerist patients within a particular physician practice, to objective measures 
of health outcomes, e.g., frequency of cardiovascular events, or intermediate measures of quality, 
such as whether diabetics have their eyes and feet examined regularly. Unfortunately, to our 
knowledge, there  are no  studies  that  come  close  to  linking  either  of these  forms  of data  to 
consumerist behavior. Good objective measures of quality, in particular, are extremely difficult 
to find in the literature.
Given these limitations, we turn to a second-best measure. We use a significant data set 
that reports on the degree of consumerism within physicians’ practices, and physicians’ own 
assessments of whether they have the ability to deliver high quality care. While a physician’s 8
reports of the prevalence of consumerism in his practice and his perceived ability to provide 
quality  health  care  are  not  perfect  measures,  studying  their  relationship  provides  important 
insights into the link between consumerism and quality at the level of the physician practice.
Our  investigation  employs  a  unique  dataset  that  includes  information  on  physician 
perceptions  about  the  quality  of  care  indicators  in  their  practices,  as  well  as  a  measure  of 
consumerism, to test the model empirically. The results are striking. We find that increased 
consumerism is perceived to adversely affect the quality of care a physician delivers. Moreover, 
the magnitudes of these negative relationships appear to be substantial.
The rest of this paper is divided into six parts. Part II presents the theoretical model. Part 
III describes the data and variables. The estimation strategy is spelled out in Part IV, and the 
results are given in Part V. Part VI distills the results and their policy implications.                                                                                                     
II. THEORETICAL MODEL:  HOW CONSUMERISM AFFECTS QUALITY 
Consumerist patients know more than their less-informed peers about their own health 
and  medical  treatments,  and  usually  have  greater  concerns  about  their  health.  The  critical 
theoretical  question  is  how  these  characteristics  translate  into  the  ultimate  quality  of  care 
delivered to them and to patients as a whole. Our basic model addresses the doctor's allocation of 
time to two classes of patients, consumerist and ordinary, assuming that she has a fixed patient 
load.
2  The fixed patient load implies that the doctor’s revenue is effectively fixed, and so we 
treat  the  doctor  as  if  she  maximizes  the  average  quality  of  the  patients  she  treats.  A  more 
complex model, where patient load could vary and physicians were concerned with income as 
well, would not change the qualitative nature of the results. 
When the doctor spends t minutes with an ordinary patient, health quality is produced 9
according to  ho=h(t).  It is  assumed that  h(t) is  strictly increasing  and  strictly concave,  with 
h(0)=0 and  h'(0)<∞. That is, there are positive but decreasing returns to time with any patient, 
and quality for zero time is normalized to 0. To simplify, we assume that all patients suffer the 
same representative condition. 
The health-time relationship for an ordinary patient is ho=h(t). Suppose that fraction μ, 0 
≤ μ ≤ 1, of patients coming into the doctor's office is consumerist. Consumerist patients differ 
from ordinary patients in two ways, which cut in opposite directions. First, because they are 
more knowledgeable and concerned, they can enhance productivity from time spent with the 
doctor. For example, they may be more effective in describing symptoms, or better able to follow 
instructions.  The  consumerist’s  potential  to  enhance  the  productivity  of  time  spent  with  the 
doctor is represented by  the parameter a ≥ 1, which multiplies the productivity of an entire 
doctor-patient encounter of a given length. 
Second, despite their superior knowledge and attentiveness, they may take the doctor's 
time for low priority activities through continual probing. They may hope to convince the doctor 
of their expertise  or to secure more  information for themselves, expecting in  the process to 
benefit from more time from the doctor, or they may simply be information “vacuum cleaners.”  
Thus they might inquire “Couldn't this be condition X?”  They may ask to have things explained, 
when that adds little or no value, or they may inquire about irrelevant treatments. The parameter 
p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, represents the fraction of the doctor's time with the consumerist devoted to 
high- as  opposed  to  low-productivity  communication. A  minute  of  low  productivity 
communication has productivity b, where  b<1.  Thus if a physician spends  t minutes  with  a 
consumerist  patient,  the  effective time  spent  with  that  consumerist  is  te =  (p+b(1-p))t.  For 
notational convenience, let r = p + b(1-p).10
Taking both factors into account, the time-health relationship for a consumerist patient is 
thus hc = a h(r t). Suppose that the doctor's average time spent per patient must less than or equal 
to T. The quality-maximizing doctor, able to identify types, chooses how much time to spend 
with each consumerist and each ordinary patient. Let to denote the time spent with each ordinary 
patient, and let tc denote the time spent with each consumerist, the doctor's problem is to choose 
to and tc in order to maximize average quality subject to the constraint that average time per 
patient be less than or equal to T:
     
 
, max 1 ,
. .  1 .
o c
o c t t
o c
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st t t T
 
 
     
  
Deriving  and  analyzing  the  first-order  conditions  for  this  problem  shows  that,  if  the  doctor 
devotes a positive amount of time to each type of patient, her optimal choices solve:
    , o c h t arh rt
    
where asterisks  denote  optimal  values of  to and  tc.  Note the  factor  ar, which multiplies  the 
marginal value of health for consumerist patients on the right-hand side of this expression. This 
factor represents the net effect of the two aspects of consumerism (i.e., that consumerists are 
more productive patients, but possibly less efficient users of the doctor’s time). When ar>1, the 
first effect outweighs the second, while if ar<1, the second effect outweighs the first. Thus, if the 
doctor sees both types of patients (i.e., spends a positive amount of time with each type), then if 
ar<1, effective  time  spent  with  ordinary  patients  is  greater  than  effective  time  spent  with 
consumerists (to
*>rtc
* ) while the opposite conclusion holds (to
*<rtc
*) if ar>1.
While the doctor’s time allocation is of some interest, our ultimate goal is to characterize 
the effect of consumerism on quality.  That is, we want to determine a positive fraction μ of 
consumerist patients affects average quality. To facilitate intuition and illustrate possibilities, it is 11
useful to consider the extreme case where marginal utility from quality is linear up to some limit, 
after which it falls to zero.  That is, let h(t) = kt – ½ t
2 for 0≤ t ≤ k and h(t) = ½ k
2 for t > k.
3
There are two basic cases to consider: ar>1, and ar<1.
4
Case 1:   ar>1. In this case, the consumerists’ better use of the doctor’s information (a>1) 
outweighs their tendency to take up the doctor’s time for low-valued interactions. The marginal 
utility of the t
th minute spent with an ordinary patient is h'(t) = k-t, while the marginal utility of 
the t
th minute spent with a consumerist patient is arh'(rt) = ark-ar
2t. Thus, when ar>1, the 
marginal-utility of time curve for consumerists lies everywhere above the marginal-utility curve 
for ordinary patients. See Figure 1.
(Insert Figure 1.)
In this case, when the doctor's time budget is tight, i.e., T is small, the doctor will devote 
all her time to consumerists, because they are much more effective producers of quality than 
ordinary patients. As the doctor's time budget increases, the doctor spends more and more total 
time with the consumerists, working her way down the consumerists' marginal value curve up to 
the point, shown as t, in the figure, where the marginal health benefit of the last minute spent 
with a consumerist equals the marginal health benefit of the first minute spent with an ordinary 
patient. Since the marginal health benefit of time for ordinary patients when to = 0 is h'(0) = k,
this  occurs  when  k=ar(k-rT'/μ), or  μk(ar-1)/ar
2 =  T'.    When  the  total  time  budget  is  T', 
consumerist patients receive t1 = k(ar-1)/ar
2 minutes of care.  At ti, the doctor begins spending a 
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Eventually, as T continues to increase, the marginal health benefit of spending additional 
time with either type of patient reaches zero. At this point, even if the doctor's time budget 
continues to increase, the doctor gives no more time to either type of patient. This occurs when  
h'(t
*
o) = 0, or  T'' = k(r+μ-rμ)/r. Thus, the full solution is given by:
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c  as functions of the overall time budget, T.
(Insert Figure 2.)
Next, we characterize, for any time budget T, how consumerism affects quality. Since we 
are primarily interested in determining the impact on quality of the presence of consumerists, the 
baseline case we consider is one in which all patients are ordinary. In the baseline case, all 
patients are identical, and each receives T minutes of care. Relative to the situation where every 
patient is ordinary, since T/μ >T, for 0 ≤ T ≤ T' were there consumerists in the population, they 
would  get  more  quality  than  they  would  get in  a  world  where  no  patient  was  consumerist.   13
Consumerists  also get more quality than they  would in  the baseline case when T>T'', since 
ah(r(T/r)) = a h(T) > h(T). Since tc
* is a continuous function of T, consumerists would only get 
less quality than in the baseline case if  tc
* = T for some T' < T < T''. It is straightforward to 
verify that no such solution exists, and hence when ar>1 consumerists always receive more 
quality than do the ordinaries who populate the baseline case.
Next, consider how consumerism affects the quality received by ordinary patients. Note 
that when ar>1, consumerists always receive more time than non-consumerists. Since for T<T'',
μtc
* + (1-μ)to
* = T, this implies that to
* < T, and hence that ordinary patients receive less quality 
when consumerists are present than they would in a world without consumerism. For T ≥ T'',
ordinary patients get the same quality with or without consumerists, since the doctor’s time-
budget constraint does not bind.
Figure 3 shows how quality changes as a function of T. Average quality must be higher 
with  consumerism  than  without.  To  see  this,  note  that  the  marginal  quality  curve  for 
consumerists lies everywhere above the marginal quality curve for ordinary patients. Thus if the 
doctor were to devote T minutes to every patient in a world with consumerism, the average 
quality  would  be  larger  with  consumerists  than  without  simply,  because  when  ar >  1
consumerists convert time into quality more efficiently than do ordinary patients. Given that the 
doctor is maximizing average quality, average quality must always be higher with consumerism 
than without.
(Insert Figure 3.)
Case 2:  ar<1. Unlike in Case 1, here the marginal quality curves for consumerists and ordinary 
patients cross, as illustrated in Figure 4. Thus, consumerists are no longer always more efficient 
quality producers than ordinary patients. At low levels of time, the doctor's time is better used to 14
concentrate  on  ordinary  patients,  since  the  lower  quality  per  minute  of  the  consumerists’ 
information outweighs the fact that they are more productive consumers of the doctor's advice. 
On  the  other  hand,  once  time  is  abundant,  the  second  effect  dominates  the  first,  and  the 
maximizing doctor concentrates more time on consumerists.
(Insert Figure 4.)
For low levels of T, it is optimal for the doctor to devote all of her time to ordinary patients. In 
this range, each ordinary patient receives T/(1-μ) minutes of time, and each consumerist receives 
0. This is true up until the point where the marginal quality of time spent on ordinary patients 
equals ark, or k – T’/(1- μ ) =  ark. Solving, this yields T
0 =(1–μ )(1 – ar)k.
As in the previous case, once the marginal quality for ordinary patients drops to the point 
where it is worthwhile to spend time on consumerists, the solution to the problem is found by 
solving the equations in (1), which yields solution (2). This remains the solution up until the 
point where the marginal utility of quality equals zero, which once again occurs at  T'' = k(r+μ –
rμ)/r. Thus the solution to the doctor's problem in Case 3 is given by:
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Clearly,  consumerists  receive  less  time  than  ordinary  patients  when  0  ≤  T ≤T
0, and 




0 ≤ T ≤T'' , this implies that there is a critical time level, T
X, such that ordinary 
patients receive more time for T<T
X  and consumerists receive more time for T>T
X. Further, tc
*15
increases more rapidly with T than to
* for      T
0 ≤ T ≤T'' . Figure 5 shows the optimal time spent 
with each type of patient as a function of T.
(Insert Figure 5.)
Having characterized the solution, we turn once again to the question of how, for any 
time budget, quality with consumerism compares to quality in the baseline case. For very tight 
time budgets, 0 ≤ T ≤T
0, consumerists get zero time and hence zero quality, and ordinary patients 
get more time and quality than they do in the baseline case. Average quality with consumerism is 
lower than in the baseline case, since the additional time spent on consumerists is spent less 
productively than it would be in the baseline case.
As before, for very high levels of time, T≥T'', both consumerists and ordinary patients 
receive time up until the point where the marginal benefit from additional care falls to zero. Thus 
consumerists receive more quality, and ordinary patients receive the same amount of quality as 
do the ordinary patients who comprise the baseline case. Over this range, since the maximum 
quality for a consumerist is higher than the maximum quality for an ordinary patient, average 
quality is once again higher with consumerism than in the baseline case.
For  intermediate  levels  of  T,  it  is  straightforward  to  show  that  health  quality  for 
consumerists rises more steeply with T  than does health quality for ordinary patients (because 
the marginal quality curve is flatter for consumerists than ordinary patients). This implies that as 
T ranges from T
0 to T'', the quality curve for consumerists crosses the quality curve for ordinary 
patients once (Figure 6).
Figure  6  has  several  notable  features.  As  explained  above,  for  high  levels  of  time, 
consumerists receive more quality than do the ordinaries of the baseline case, and this increases 
average quality. For low levels of time, consumerists get zero time, and ordinary consumers 16
receive  more  time  than  in  the  baseline  case.  The  overall  result  is  that  average  quality  falls 
relative to the baseline case. The interesting part of the problem is what happens for intermediate 
time budgets. Since the quality curves are continuous and cross but once, average quality starts 
lower than in the baseline case, but then rises above it, starting at point A in Figure 6. 
(Insert Figure 6.)
Another notable feature of Figure 6 is that there is a range of time budgets over which 
both consumerists and ordinary patients do worse than in the baseline case. To see why this must 
be  so,  consider  the  point  where  the  marginal  benefit  curves  for  consumerists  and  non-
consumerists cross, labeled T
*in Figure 4. If the time budget is T
*, then the doctor allocates the 
same amount of time to consumerists and ordinary patients. For that budget, ordinary patients get 
the same quality that they would get in a world without consumerism, while consumerists get 
less quality than would every patient in a world without consumerism (since the consumerist's 
marginal benefit curve lies everywhere below the marginal benefit curve for ordinary patients to 
the left of T
* in Figure 4). 
Now, suppose that the time budget increases slightly to T
* + Δ. Since the consumerists' 
marginal benefit curve lies above the ordinary patients' marginal benefit curve to the right of T
*, 
consumerists receive a disproportionate share of this additional time. Thus, ordinary patients get 
less than T
* + Δ minutes of time, on average. This implies that they do worse in a world with 
consumerism than they do without consumerism (since in the latter world they receive T
* + Δ
minutes of time). On the other hand, since at time budget T
* consumerists do strictly worse in a 
world with consumerism than people do without consumerism, by continuity they also do strictly 
worse at time budget T
* + Δ. Thus, at T
* + Δ both consumerists and ordinary patients suffer from 
the presence of consumerists, and by continuity this is also true for a range of time budgets 17
around T
* + Δ.
Discussion and Qualifications of the Theoretical Model
The model shows that consumerism may affect quality in many ways, some counter to 
naïve intuition. This was starkly illustrated by the fact that, provided that the doctor’s time-
budget binds, consumerism is never Pareto improving. Relative to a world in which all patients 
are  ordinary,  consumerism  always  harms  either  consumerists  or  ordinary  patients  (and 
sometimes both).
Even  in  a  world  where  consumerists  are  more  productive  users  of  the  doctor’s 
information but do not “waste” the doctor’s time (i.e., a > 1 and r = 1), consumerism harms 
ordinary patients. Here, the doctor chooses to spend more time with consumerists, since they 
benefit more from it. However, this necessarily leaves less time for ordinary patients. Although 
average quality  increases  in  this  case,  ordinary  patients  suffer.  Thus,  at  the  very  least, 
consumerism has distributional consequences that should be taken into account when discussing 
its merits.
If we introduce the idea that a consumerist may not make efficient use of the doctor’s 
time (i.e., r < 1), this raises the possibility that consumerism harms all patients. This is possible 
when the marginal value of time spent with consumerists is relatively low relative to ordinary 
patients  early  on,  but  higher  after  some  point.  In  this  case,  the  doctor  must  spend  a  lot  of 
unproductive time with consumerist patients before they get information that is (relatively) high-
valued,  thus  leaving  little  time  for  ordinary  patients.  Ordinary  patients  suffer  because  they 
receive too little time from the doctor, while consumerists suffer because they make poor use of 
the time they take, especially the “early minutes” whose marginal value is low relative to time 18
spent with ordinary patients. 
For the sake of illustration we have assumed that the doctor has a fixed time budget and 
number of patients. The presence of consumerists imposes an externality, sometimes negative 
sometimes positive, on ordinary patients and on each other. This would remain true even if the 
doctor’s time budget were elastic, as long as it was not so elastic that she always devoted enough 
hours to reach a particular level of quality. If the doctor were inclined to vary T substantially, 
then the doctor would respond to the advent of consumerism by adjusting total working hours. If 
that  adjustment  were  upwards,  obviously,  a  Pareto  improvement  could  result.  If  the  doctor 
adjusted  the  number  of  patients,  increasing  their  numbers  could  not  lead  to a  Pareto 
improvement, and cutting their numbers leads to Pareto noncomparability, since some patients 
go from being seen to being treated elsewhere. , 
The  model  presented  here  is  simple.  However,  the  basic  insights  of  the  model,  that 
consumerism  need  not benefit  everyone  and,  in  fact,  may  harm  everyone,  extend  to  more 
complex functional forms. Indeed, the fact that these phenomena arise in such a simple model 
suggests that they would be readily found in more complex models.
III. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data
We employ physician survey data from the 2000-01 Community Tracking Study (CTS), 
conducted by the Gallup Poll and maintained at the Center for Studying Health System Change. 
It includes 12,406 physicians who are engaged in direct patient care for at least 20 hours per 19
week in 60 selected communities in the United States. The response rate of the CTS physician 
survey  is  above  60  percent
5 (Strunk  and  Reschovsky,  2002).  The  survey  inquires  about  a 
physician’s percent of consumerist patients, adequacy of time with patients, and the quality of 
health care s/he delivers, as well as a wealth of information on the physician’s specialty, practice 
and demographic characteristics, income, involvement with  managed care  arrangements,  and 
perceptions about competitive pressures. After excluding approximately 4 percent of physicians 
who did not respond to questions about consumerist patients, the study sample includes 11,936 
respondents. 
Dependent Variables
We consider three dependent variables, each of which provides a slightly different insight 
into physicians’ perceptions of the quality of care they provide. All three quality of care variables 
are  measured  on  a  5-point  Likert  scale.  Possible  physician  responses  to  our  three  quality 
questions are: 1) disagree strongly, 2) disagree somewhat, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) agree 
somewhat, and 5) agree strongly. 
Our theoretical model recognizes that consumerist patients may take up more physician 
time than do ordinary patients. Thus, we first seek to examine the effect of consumerism on 
physicians’ perceptions about the adequacy of time with their patients. Although the question 
does  not  directly  inquire  about  quality,  time  adequacy  can  be  viewed  as  a  measure  of  the 
physician’s view of her ability to provide quality care. If time is inadequate, presumably he could 
be doing more for patients if he had more time.20
Quality Measure 1 (Q1): Strength of agreement: I have adequate time to spend with my 
patients during typical office/patient visits.
We turn next to two more-direct indicators of quality of care. The first considers whether 
the physician believes he has adequate time to spend with his patients, the second shows whether 
the  physician  believes  that  he  can  provide  quality of  care  to  all  the  patients,  and  the  third 
indicates whether the physician believes that he can keep continuing relationships with patients 
to promote quality.
Quality Measure 2 (Q2):  Strength of agreement: it is possible to provide high quality care to 
all of my patients. 
It is recommended that doctors and patients maintain continuing relationships as a means 
to  promote  trust,  communication,  understanding  of  the  patient’s  overall  condition,  and  thus 
quality of care. The third quality question is: 
Quality Measure 3 (Q3): Strength of agreement: it is possible to maintain the kind of continuing 
relationships with patients over time that promote the delivery of high quality care. 
Independent Variables
The  independent  variable  of  primary  interest  is  a  measure  of  consumerism  in  the 
physician’s  practice.  We  also  employ  a  number  of  controls  to  help  isolate  the  effect  of 
consumerism on out outcome variables.21
Consumerism  measure.  The  CTS  physician  survey  asked  physicians  the  critical 
question for our purposes, because it provides direct evidence on the extent of consumerism in a 
physician’s patient caseload: 
During the last month, what percentage of your patients talked about medical 
conditions, tests, treatments, or drugs they had read or heard bout from various 
sources other than you, such as the Internet, their friends, relatives, TV, radio, 
books, or magazines? 
The response to this question gives our measure of the percent of consumerist patients in the 
physician’s patient caseload. As noted earlier, consumerism takes many forms, and any attempt
to define or measure it is open to criticism. The strength of this measure is that it captures the 
features that comprise the essence of consumerism; namely, gleaning medical information from 
sources  other  than  one's  doctor  and  engaging  one’s  doctor  in  discussions  about  alternative 
treatment options. This measure of consumerism also accords with the one in our theoretical 
model. 
Other explanatory variables. In our analysis, we also control for a variety of physician 
demographic and practice characteristics that may affect time adequacy and the quality of care. 
These  variables  include  physician  gender,  race,  board  certification  status,  and  domestic  or 
foreign  medical  graduate.  We  also  control  for  physician  specialty  (general/family  practice, 
internal medicine, medical specialty, surgical specialty, psychiatry, and obstetrics/gynecology 
with general/family practice as the reference group), practice experience (categorized into groups 
to account for potential non-linearities: less than or equal to 5 years, 6-14 years, 15-24 years, and 
greater than or equal to 25 years with 6-14 years as the reference group),  type of practice (solo/2 
physicians practice, group practice with 3 physicians or more, HMO practice, medical school, 22
hospital, and other practice type, with solo/2 physicians practice works as the reference group), 
annual practice income and annual hours of work.
To  help  control  for  the characteristics  of  patients  within  a  physician’s  practice,  we 
include  the  percent  of  the  physician's  revenue  from  managed  care,  Medicaid  and  Medicare. 
Competitive pressures in the physician's practice area may also affect health care quality. Thus 
we use binary variables indicating whether the physician perceives his market area to be very 
competitive, somewhat competitive, or not competitive. 
Instrumental  variables    As  will  be  discussed  more  fully  below,  our  consumerism 
measure may be endogenous. To cope with this, we employ instrumental variables estimation. 
As the first step, we merged the CTS physician survey with the CTS household survey for the 
same year, utilizing data on the 60 distinct CTS survey areas. The CTS household survey had 
59,725 respondents in approximately 33,000 households (Center for Studying Health System 
Change,  2003b).  We  then  employed  information  from  the  household  survey  to  provide 
instrumental variables for the measure of consumerist patients in each physician’s practice area. 
The 2000-2001 CTS household survey asked each respondent a direct question about 
consumerism.
During the past year, did you look for or get information about a personal health 
concern from  sources  other  than  your  physicians:  (1) Internet;  (2) friends  or 
relatives; (3) TV or radio; (4) book or magazines; (5) health care professionals 
(excluding physicians); (6) health care organizations; or (7) somewhere else?                                 
Respondents in the CTS household survey answered whether s/he got information from 
each of above 7 sources, and we started by constructing 7 binary variables representing a “yes” 
or “no” answer each information source. However, these measures were highly collinear because 23
a respondent may use several sources  for medical information.  In examining these data, we 
found that friends or relatives were the most commonly-cited source of information, though other 
sources were important as well. This is consistent with findings in the previous literature, namely 
that people often trust the medical information from their friends and relatives besides their 
doctors (see e.g., Marshall et al., 2000; Schwartz et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007). We therefore 
constructed two instrumental variables from these data:
Instrument  1:  A  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  respondent  got  medical 
information about a personal health concern from friends or relatives and equals 
to 0 otherwise;
and 
Instrument 2: A count variable indicating the total number of sources from which 
the respondent obtained medical information other than his or her physician. 
We then calculated the mean values of the two instrumental variables for the 60 CTS 
survey areas. Each instrumental variable thus measures the extent to which patients in a survey 
area acquire medical information from sources other than their physicians. We anticipated that 
both instrumental variables would be strongly and positively correlated with the percentage of 
consumerist patients that each physician treats. This expectation was fulfilled. Because these two 
instrumental variables are strongly correlated, however, they are used separately. 
III. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Model Specification24
We  will  estimate  the  effect  of  consumerism  on  each  of  the  three  quality  measures 
described above. We assume that the quality of care that a physician perceives take the following 
functional form: 
Q = β0 + Xβ1 + Cβ2 + ε         (3)
where
Q = quality of care measure: Q1, Q2, or Q3; 
X = a vector of physician demographic/practice characteristics; 
C =  consumerism measure;  
β0 - β2 = coefficients to be estimated; and                  
ε = a disturbance term. 
The estimated coefficient β2 shows the effect of consumerism on the quality of care measure, and 
is the parameter of key interest. If β2 is positive, then consumerism improves the quality of care. 
On the other hand, a negative value for this coefficient means that consumerism is associated 
with lower quality perceived by physicians. Our theoretical model hypothesized that consumerist 
patients take more physician time, but showed the conditions under which either positive or 
negative effect on care quality are possible.  
Endogeneity. The  above  specification  does  not  recognize  that  the  measure  of 
consumerism may be endogenous. Endogeneity may enter due to either omitted variables or 
simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2001). If it is present, the estimated coefficient β2 in equation (3) will 
be biased due to correlation between the consumerism measure C and the disturbance term ε. To 
illustrate  a  potential  source  of  bias,  physicians  and  patients  are  not  randomly  selected,  and 
consumerist patients may choose their physicians based on some criteria that researchers cannot 
observe. Those physicians who tend to match with consumerist patients may be more tolerant of 25
these  patients,  have  more  time  for  each  patient,  and/or  may  have  different  views  on  how 
consumerism affects their ability to provide high quality of care. The endogeneity due to this 
matching  issue  may  over-estimate  the  positive  effect  of  consumerism  or  under-estimate  the 
negative effect of consumerism. 
In addition, endogeneity may arise if people who receive poor care or are in poor health 
feel a greater need to acquire information about their care.  If either were true, then the single-
equation approach would over-estimate the negative effect of consumerism or under-estimate the 
positive effect of consumerism.  To address this endogeneity issue, we write the consumerism 
equation as:
C = α0 + Xα1 + Zα2 + u                  (4)
where
Z = instrumental variable(s);
α0 - α2 = coefficients to be estimated; and 
u = a disturbance term. 
If both the quality measure and consumerism were continuous, traditional two-stage least 
squares would yield a consistent estimate of β2. But if, as in the present case, all the quality of 
care measures are ordered and categorical variables, two-stage least squares is not appropriate 
(Terza, Basu, and Rathouz, 2008). 
The control function
6 model as a two-step method is available to consistently estimate the 
effect of consumerism on the quality of care in this case (Smith and Blundell, 1986; Rivers and 
Vuong, 1988, Wooldridge, 2001). The first step for implementing the control function approach 
is to estimate equation (4) via ordinary least squares (OLS) and obtain the estimated residual û. 26
Then we append the estimated residual in  equation (3) as a new covariate and estimate the 
following equation: 
Y = β0 + Xβ1 + Cβ2 + ûβ3 + e         (5)
This estimation approach also provides an exogeneity test of the consumerism variable 
(Hausman, 1978, 1983; Wooldridge, 2002). Although pure maximum likelihood estimation is 
more efficient, this two-step method as a limited information procedure is quite straightforward 
and  still  produces  consistent  estimates  of  the  model  coefficients  β0 - β3 (Terza,  Basu,  and 
Rathouz, 2008). In addition, maximum likelihood estimation depends on the joint distribution 
assumed between two disturbance terms, and “sometimes it can be computationally difficult to 
get iterations to converge” (Wooldridge, 2001). In the case where the second-stage dependent 
variable is continuous, so that two-stage least squares estimation is appropriate, this two-step 
method as a limited information procedure produces exactly the same results as two-stage least 
squares (Anderson, 2005). Due to the two-step feature of the model, the standard errors in the 
second step will be adjusted by nonparametric bootstrap techniques using 200 replications. Bias-
corrected statistical levels are reported for estimated coefficients in the tables. 
V. RESULTS
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our study sample. The mean values of the three 
quality  measures  are  respectively  3.40,  3.96  and  3.82  on the  ordered  and  categorical  scales 
between 1 and 5. The independent variable that is our focus is the measure of the percent of 
patients  who  are  consumerist.  On  average,  physicians  have  16.7  percent  of  patients  in  this 
category. 
(Insert Table 1)27
Associations  between  consumerism  and  the  quality  of  care.  Before  turning  to 
multivariate  evidence  and  the  rigorous  analysis  and  testing  it  allows,  Figure  1  provides 
information  on  the  association  between  the  percentage  of  a  physician’s  patients  who  are 
consumerist  and  time  adequacy  measure.  As  Figure  7  indicates,  physicians  having  more 
consumerist  patients  are  more  likely  to  answer  “disagree”  with  quality  measure  Q1 (time 
adequacy).  This  negative  correlation  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1  percent  level
7. The 
relationship between consumerist patient percentage and the other two quality measures are also 
negative as shown in Figures 7. 
(Insert Figure 7)
Thus, even at the grossest level, it appears that physicians report a negative relationship between 
consumerism and quality.
Multivariate evidence. It is possible that some third intervening variable affects both 
consumerism and the quality of care. Hence, it is essential to determine whether these patterns 
persist  in  multivariate analysis.  Table  2 provides  the  results  of  multivariate  ordered  probit 
regression analyses predicting the first quality of care measure.  In the single equation model, 
there is a statistically significant, negative relationship between consumerism and quality (Q1).  
However, the magnitude of the coefficient is small and unlikely to be of practical significance.
(Insert Table 2)
The  second  and  third  columns  control  for  endogeneity,  each  using  one  of  the  two 
instrumental variables. To implement the control function correction for endogeneity, we first 
estimate the models predicting the percentage of consumerist patients. We use each instrument 
separately to check the robustness of the results to an alternative choice of instruments. These 
results, provided in Appendix A1, show that each instrumental variable correlates strongly and 28
positively with the percentage of consumerist patients; moreover, their coefficients are highly 
significant.  We  also  perform  under-identification  and  weak  identification  tests  for  each 
instrumental variable. The results of these tests indicate that our instruments are sound. The fitted 
residuals from the control function models in Table 2 are statistically significant, indicating that 
the consumerism measure is endogenous. Controlling for endogeneity, we find a negative and 
significant effect of consumerism on the first quality of care measure. Moreover, the magnitude 
of this effect is substantially larger in absolute value than that with single equation model: a ten 
percentage point increase in consumerism would lower the answers to our question by a full 
point.
The coefficients on the fitted residuals are positive, indicating that the disturbance terms 
between the quality equation and consumerism equation are positively correlated (Wooldridge,
2001).  What  factors  might  produce  this  pattern?  Patients  might  have  preferences  for their 
physician choices. Consumerist patients, thus being both more informed and more demanding,
might prefer physicians who are more likely to have adequate time to spend with patients and are 
willing to listen to their patients. If so, the single equation model, which does not adjust for 
patient  selection  effects,  would understate  the  negative  effects  of  consumerism  on  the  time
adequacy measure. 
(Insert Table 3)
Tables 3 and 4 report the multivariate results for the other two quality of care measures. 
The control function models again reveal negative, statistically significant, relationships between 
consumerism and these quality measures. A ten percentage point increase in consumerism would 
lower the answers to the quality questions by roughly four tenths of apoint, except for Q3 and 
instrument 2, where there is a seven tenths of a point decrease The control function models also 29
indicate that the consumerism measure is endogenous. Consistent with the results in Table 2, the 
endogeneity-corrected estimates in Tables 3 and 4 again reveal a stronger negative relationship 
between consumerism and the quality of care than did the single equation model. Once again, 
selection effects could explain these patterns – e.g., consumerist patients select higher-quality 
doctors. 
(Insert Table 4)
To gain a better sense of the impact of consumerism, we next consider the impact of 
increasing consumerism on the distribution of the doctors’ responses to the quality questions. 
Figure 8 calculates the predicted probabilities for the first quality measure (time adequacy) with 
different consumerism levels, controlling for the endogeneity of consumerism with instrument 1.
We set the shares of consumerist patients among all the patients from 5 percent (25th percentile 
of consumerism measure), 10 percent (50th percentile of consumerism measure), and 20 percent 
(75th percentile of consumerism measure). We find that, as the share of consumerist patients 
rises,  substantially  more  physicians  disagree  strongly  or  disagree  somewhat  that  they  have 
adequate  time  to  spend  with  patients,  suggesting  that  consumerist  patients  do  occupy more 
physician time during office visits. When the level of consumerism lies at the 25th percentile, 6.6 
percent of  physicians  strongly disagree  that  they  have  adequate  time  to  spend  with  patients 
during typical office visits. These predicted probabilities of disagreeing strongly increase to 13.3 
percent when the level of consumerism is 50th percentile and 35.3 percent when the level of 
consumerism  is  75th  percentile.  Figure  8 also  shows  the  predicted  probabilities  of  agreeing 
strongly that the physician has adequate time are 55.21 percent, 42.83 percent, and 23.97 percent, 
respectively, as the levels of consumerism rise from 25th percentile to 75th percentile. 
(Insert Figure 8)30
The  predicted  probabilities  of  the  second  and  third quality  of  care  measures  using 
instrument 1 are reported in Figures 9 and 10. The trends are similar to those in the time measure. 
The  predicted  probabilities  of  quality  measures  using  the  instrument  2  are  similar  to  those 
reported in Figures 8-10 and are available from the authors upon request. 
(Insert Figure 9)
(Insert Figure 10)
Though our focus is on the effects of consumerism, this study yields additional insights 
about the quality of care. For example, other results indicate that physicians in more competitive 
markets perceive greater difficulty in providing high quality care in the second stage. Greater 
physician involvement in managed care is also associated with less perceived ability to provide 
high  quality  of  care.  Relative  to  general/family  practitioners  (the  reference  specialty),  most 
physician  specialists  perceive  a  greater  ability  to  provide  high  quality  of  care.  A  notable 
exception  is  psychiatry,  where  physicians  perceive  significantly  less  ability  to  provide  high 
quality care. Younger physicians are generally more likely to believe that they can provide high 
quality of care. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The changing relationships between physicians and their patients stimulated by the rise of 
consumerism may have profound implications for the quality of medical care. To date, however, 
the literature has not examined, much less quantified this relationship. Our theoretical model 
shows that consumerism need not unambiguously improve quality, while the empirical results 
show  strong  and  consistent  evidence  that  physicians  with  more  consumerist  patients  are 
substantially less likely to believe that they can deliver high quality of care. These results are31
found with a single equation model (ordered probit estimation).  They are much stronger when
we employ instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity of the consumerism measure.   The 
findings apply for each of our three alternative quality indicators.
We should mention a caveat: our results rely on physicians’ perception of quality, which 
may differ from actual quality.  However, as long as perceived quality is (positively) correlated 
with actual quality, and this divergence does not  vary systematically with consumerism, our 
results still have merit.  
The negative association between consumerism and our quality of care measures holds
potentially serious implications for the success of patient empowerment. Though perhaps more 
knowledgeable, consumerist patients may turn out to claim excess time to the disbenefit of other 
patients. If large numbers of patients in a practice are consumerist, a form of rat race may emerge
among them.  Efforts  by  many patients  to  claim  disproportionate amounts  of time  – as may 
happen with grabby parents on a teacher’s night – may lead to none of them getting it, and all 
being dissatisfied. This raises the additional risk that their physician may feel underappreciated 
and over attacked. 
These findings remind us that providing consumers with more health care information 
and  increasing  their  role  in  medical  decision  making bring  costs  as  well  as  benefits.  Our 
theoretical model shows the possibility that the net results of consumerism for quality could well 
be negative. Our empirical results indicate that alas they are. 
The  rise  in  consumerism  has  changed the  nature  of  the  agency  relationship  between 
physicians and their patients. This agency relationship lies at the heart of the performance on 
medical markets, as Arrow (1963) noted many years ago. We have long known that faithful 32
agents  are  critical  for  effective  medical  performance.  Modern  developments  have  made  it 
important to study the impact of better-informed but more demanding principals. 33
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Table 1: Names and summary statistics for study variables, N = 11,936
Variables Mean Min Max
Quality of care 1
    Physicians have adequate time to spend with patients
    during typical office visits 3.40 (1.42) 1 5
        Distribution (%)
        1. disagree strongly 12.93 0 100
        2. disagree somewhat 23.19 0 100
        3. neither agree nor disagree 2.35 0 100
        4. agree somewhat 34.39 0 100
        5. agree strongly 27.14 0 100
            total 100.00
Quality of care 2
    Physicians can provide high quality care to all of 
    patients 3.96 (1.22) 1 5
        Distribution (%)
        1. disagree strongly 5.10 0 100
        2. disagree somewhat 14.56 0 100
        3. neither agree nor disagree 1.94 0 100
        4. agree somewhat 36.48 0 100
        5. agree strongly 41.92 0 100
            total 100.00
Quality of care 3
    Physicians can maintain continuing relationships with
   patients to promote high quality care  3.82 (1.29) 1 5
        Distribution (%)
        1. disagree strongly 7.63 0 100
        2. disagree somewhat 15.17 0 100
        3. neither agree nor disagree 2.67 0 100
        4. agree somewhat 36.15 0 100
        5. agree strongly 38.38 0 100
            total 100.00
Consumerist patient percentage 16.71 (16.87) 0 85
Instrumental variables for consumerist patient percentage
    Mean percentage of people in CTS survey areas who
    get medical information from friends or relatives
1 19.21 (2.15) 11.91 27.25
    Mean number of sources from which people in CTS 
    survey areas get medical information
1 0.71 (0.08) 0.44 1.02
Other explanatory variables
    Annual practice income in $100,000 1.58 (0.83) 0 4.00
    Annual practice hours in 1,000 2.52 (0.81) 0 8.40
    Proportion of revenue from managed care 0.46 (0.28) 0 1
    Proportion of revenue from Medicare 0.30 (0.23) 0 1
    Proportion of revenue from Medicaid 0.15 (0.18) 0 1
    Male (dummy variable) 0.74 0 1
    Board certified (dummy variable) 0.88 0 1
    Foreign medical school graduate (dummy variable) 0.21 0 1
    Race (dummy variables)39
        White 0.79 0 1
        Black 0.04 0 1
        other race 0.17 0 1
    Practice specialty  (dummy variables)
        general/family practice 0.26 0 1
        internal medicine 0.21 0 1
        pediatrics 0.15 0 1
        medical specialty 0.19 0 1
        surgical specialty 0.11 0 1
        psychiatry 0.04 0 1
        obstetrics/gynecology 0.04 0 1
    Practice experience  (dummy variables)
        less than or equal to 5 years 0.04 0 1
        6-14 years 0.40 0 1
        15-24 years 0.32 0 1
        more than or equal to 25 years 0.24 0 1
    Practice type  (dummy variables)
        solo/2 physicians 0.35 0 1
        group practice >=3 physicians 0.29 0 1
        HMO 0.05 0 1
        medical school 0.08 0 1
        hospital based 0.13 0 1
        other practice type 0.10 0 1
    Practice market competition status  (dummy variables)
        not at all competitive 0.34 0 1
        somewhat competitive 0.45 0 1
        very competitive 0.21 0 1
Data source: Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician survey 2000-2001.
Note: standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. 
1. Instrumental variables are Community Tracking Study (CTS) household survey 2000-2001. 40
Table 2: Consumerism and quality of care 1
Variables
Q1: Physicians  have adequate time to spend with patients 
during typical office visits 
Ordered probit model (coefficient)
Single equation 




Consumerist patient percentage -0.003 *** -0.098 *** -0.109 ***
Fitted residual from the first stage N/A 0.096 *** 0.107 ***
Other explanatory variables
    Annual practice income in $100,000 -0.01 -0.03 ** -0.04 **
    Annual practice hours in 1,000 -0.14 *** 0.02 0.04
    Proportion of revenue from managed care -0.47 *** -0.19 *** -0.16 **
    Proportion of revenue from Medicare -0.08 * 0.16 *** 0.18 ***
    Proportion of revenue from Medicaid -0.24 *** -0.84 *** 0.91 ***
    Male 0.16 *** -0.29 *** -0.35 ***
    Board certified -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.18 ***
    Foreign medical school graduate 0.07 *** 0.07 ** 0.07 **
    Race 
        White (reference) 
        Black -0.02 -0.19 *** -0.21 ***
        other race 0.07 ** -0.10 ** -0.12 ***
    Practice specialty
        general/family practice  (reference) 
        internal medicine 0.03 0.14 *** 0.16 ***
        pediatrics 0.18 *** -0.13 ** -0.16 **
        medical specialty 0.22 *** 0.16 *** 0.15 ***
        surgical specialty 0.38 *** 0.40 *** 0.40 ***
        psychiatry 0.17 *** 0.54 *** 0.59 ***
        obstetrics/gynecology 0.29 *** 0.71 *** 0.76 ***
    Practice experience
        less than or equal to 5 years  -0.02 0.16 *** 0.18 ***
        6-14 years (reference) 
        15-24 years 0.01 -0.15 *** -0.17 ***
        more than or equal to 25 years 0.30 *** 0.08 * 0.06
    Practice type
        solo/2 physicians  (reference) 
        group practice >=3 physicians -0.27 *** -0.29 *** -0.30 ***
        HMO -0.35 *** -0.34 *** -0.34 ***
        medical school -0.24 *** -0.17 *** -0.16 ***
        hospital based -0.16 *** -0.32 *** -0.33 ***
        other practice type -0.30 *** -0.43 *** -0.44 ***
    Practice market competition status
        not at all competitive  (reference) 
        somewhat competitive -0.08 *** 0.01 0.02
        very competitive -0.11 *** 0.13 *** 0.16 ***
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
N/A: not applicable. 
1 Instrument 1 is mean percentage of people in CTS survey areas who get medical information from friends or 
relatives.
2 Instrument 2 is Mean number of sources from which people in CTS survey areas get medical information.41
Table 3: Consumerism and quality of care 2
Variables
Q2: Physicians can provide high quality care to all of patients
Ordered probit model (coefficient)
Single equation 




Consumerist patient percentage -0.004 *** -0.037 ** -0.037 **
Fitted residual from the first stage N/A 0.033 ** 0.034 *
Other explanatory variables
    Annual practice income in $100,000 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 ***
    Annual practice hours in 1,000 -0.08 *** -0.03 -0.02
    Proportion of revenue from managed care -0.22 *** -0.12 ** -0.12 *
    Proportion of revenue from Medicare -0.02 0.07 0.07
    Proportion of revenue from Medicaid -0.32 *** -0.53 *** -0.53 ***
    Male 0.14 *** -0.02 -0.02
    Board certified -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
    Foreign medical school graduate 0.04 0.04 0.04
    Race 
        White (reference) 
        Black -0.06 -0.12 ** -0.12 **
        other race 0.09 *** 0.03 0.03
    Practice specialty
        general/family practice  (reference) 
        internal medicine 0.12 *** 0.16 *** 0.16 ***
        pediatrics 0.35 *** 0.24 *** 0.24 ***
        medical specialty 0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 ***
        surgical specialty 0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 ***
        psychiatry -0.25 *** -0.12 -0.12
        obstetrics/gynecology 0.17 *** 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
    Practice experience
        less than or equal to 5 years  0.10 ** 0.16 *** 0.16 ***
        6-14 years (reference)
        15-24 years -0.06 ** -0.11 *** -0.12 ***
        more than or equal to 25 years 0.13 *** 0.05 0.05
    Practice type
        solo/2 physicians  (reference) 
        group practice >=3 physicians 0.03 0.02 0.02
        HMO 0.31 *** 0.31 *** 0.31 ***
        medical school 0.04 0.06 0.06
        hospital based 0.08 ** 0.02 0.02
        other practice type -0.04 -0.08 ** -0.08 *
    Practice market competition status
        not at all competitive  (reference) 
        somewhat competitive -0.08 *** -0.05 * -0.05 *
        very competitive -0.16 *** -0.08 -0.08
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
N/A: not applicable. 
1 Instrument 1 is mean percentage of people in CTS survey areas who get medical information from friends or 
relatives.
2 Instrument 2 is Mean number of sources from which people in CTS survey areas get medical information.42
Table 4: Consumerism and quality of care 3
Variables
Q3: Physicians can maintain continuing relationships with 
patients to promote high quality care
Ordered probit model (coefficient)
Single equation 




Consumerist patient percentage -0.002 *** -0.040 ** -0.070 **
Fitted residual from the first stage N/A -0.039 ** 0.069 **
Other explanatory variables
    Annual practice income in $100,000 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 ***
    Annual practice hours in 1,000 -0.04 *** 0.03 0.08 **
    Proportion of revenue from managed care -0.41 *** -0.30 *** -0.21 ***
    Proportion of revenue from Medicare 0.03 0.12 * 0.20 ***
    Proportion of revenue from Medicaid -0.03 -0.27 ** -0.46 ***
    Male 0.04 -0.14 * -0.29 ***
    Board certified -0.07 ** -0.06 * -0.06 *
    Foreign medical school graduate 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 ***
    Race 
        White (reference) 
        Black 0.10 * 0.03 -0.03
        other race 0.15 *** 0.08 ** 0.03
    Practice specialty
        general/family practice  (reference) 
        internal medicine -0.06 * -0.01 0.03
        pediatrics 0.17 *** 0.04 -0.05
        medical specialty -0.11 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 ***
        surgical specialty -0.09 ** -0.08 ** -0.08 *
        psychiatry -0.30 *** -0.15 * -0.03
        obstetrics/gynecology -0.12 ** 0.05 0.18 *
    Practice experience
        less than or equal to 5 years  0.17 *** 0.25 *** 0.30 ***
        6-14 years (reference) 
        15-24 years -0.13 *** -0.19 *** -0.24 ***
        more than or equal to 25 years 0.02 -0.07 -0.14 ***
    Practice type
        solo/2 physicians  (reference) 
        group practice >=3 physicians 0.04 0.03 0.02
        HMO 0.38 *** 0.38 *** 0.38 ***
        medical school 0.09 ** 0.12 *** 0.14 ***
        hospital based 0.05 -0.02 -0.07
        other practice type 0.02 -0.03 -0.07
    Practice market competition status
        not at all competitive  (reference) 
        somewhat competitive -0.12 *** -0.08 *** -0.05 *
        very competitive -0.22 *** -0.12 ** -0.04
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
N/A: not applicable. 
1 Instrument 1 is mean percentage of people in CTS survey areas who get medical information from friends or 
relatives.
2 Instrument 2 is Mean number of sources from which people in CTS survey areas get medical information.43






Figure 2: Optimal Time Allocation: ar > 1.















Figure 3: Optimal Quality: ar > 1.














Figure 5: Optimal Time Allocation: ar < 1.















Figure 6: Optimal Quality: ar<1.



















































1 2 3 4 5
Data source: Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician survey 2000 - 2001
Quality of Care 1: Have Adequate Time to Spend












































1 2 3 4 5
Data source: Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician survey 2000 - 2001
Quality of Care 2: Can Provide High Quality Care











































1 2 3 4 5
Data source: Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician survey 2000 - 2001
Quality of Care 3: Can Maintain Continuing Relationships
with Patients to Promote High Quality Care46
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Appendix A1: Estimation of the first stage
Variables
Consumerist patient percentage
The first stage estimation
Instrument 1 Instrument 2
Instrumental variables for consumerist patient percentage
    Instrument 1: mean percentage of people in CTS survey areas 
    who get medical information from friends or relatives 0.30 *** N/A
    Instrument 2: mean number of sources from which people in 
    CTS survey areas get medical information N/A 6.90 ***
Other explanatory variables
    Annual practice income in $100,000 -0.25 -0.25
    Annual practice hours in 1,000 1.74 *** 1.75 ***
    Proportion of revenue from managed care 2.78 *** 2.75 ***
    Proportion of revenue from Medicare 2.74 *** 2.74 ***
    Proportion of revenue from Medicaid -6.05 *** -6.06 ***
    Male -4.71 *** -4.72 ***
    Board certified 0.03 0.03
    Foreign medical school graduate -0.10 -0.10
    Race 
        White (reference) 
        Black -1.83 ** -1.85 **
        other race -1.74 *** -1.77 ***
    Practice specialty
        general/family practice  (reference) 
        internal medicine 1.05 ** 1.07 **
        pediatrics -3.24 *** -3.22 ***
        medical specialty -0.69 -0.69
        surgical specialty 0.04 0.05
        psychiatry 3.74 *** 3.73 ***
        obstetrics/gynecology 4.36 *** 4.37 ***
    Practice experience
        less than or equal to 5 years  1.94 *** 1.92 ***
        6-14 years (reference) 
        15-24 years -1.69 *** -1.68 ***
        more than or equal to 25 years -2.35 *** -2.35 ***
    Practice type
        solo/2 physicians  (reference) 
        group practice >=3 physicians -0.23 -0.24
        HMO 0.08 0.04
        medical school 0.81 0.80
        hospital based -1.57 *** -1.55 ***
        other practice type -1.30 ** -1.30 **
    Practice market competition status
        not at all competitive  (reference) 
        somewhat competitive 0.93 *** 0.94 ***
        very competitive 2.48 *** 2.49 ***
    Constant 10.13 *** 11.00 ***
Tests for instrumental variables
    Under-identification test, Anderson LM statistic 18.20 13.58
    Weak identification test, Crag-Donald Wald statistic 18.19 13.57
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
N/A: not applicable. 49
ENDNOTES
                                                
1 The term “consumerism” is also used in a different context with a quite different meaning. It is 
sometimes associated with “consumer-driven health plans,” which feature high deductibles, often 
coupled with health savings accounts. See Wilensky (2006).
2 For explanatory purposes, we will treat the physician as female and patients as male. 
3 While this assumption facilitates the analysis, the graphical arguments show that the qualitative 
results generalize to more general functional forms.  Further, the goal of the model is to illustrate 
that the relationship between consumerism and quality is complex, and that consumerism need 
not improve quality.  Given that this is true for the simple functional form employed here, it is all 
the more likely to be so in less well-behaved environments.
4 For brevity, we do not present the knife-edge case where ar=1.  The analysis is available from 
the authors.
5 A review of the CTS database concluded that “there was little evidence of a systematic under 
representation among demographic and practice characteristics available for all physicians from 
the  American Medical  Association  Masterfile”  (Center  for  Studying Health  System  Change, 
2003a, p. C19-C20).
6 Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008) term this model as two-stage residual inclusion estimation. 
7 By the test of analysis of variance (ANOVA). 